An Integrated, Pragmatic Approach to Political Consensus in the New Iraq

(IraqiNews.com) Although the sectarian violence in Iraq is now manifesting itself in a markedly different way than before, we still seem to be right back where we were in 2007.  ISIS, whose myopic goal is to remake the entire region into a caliphate, would not have achieved its stunning, near mythic successes without the active and subtle support that it has received from many Sunni groups who have been cruelly short-changed by the current political system.

The main problem is not so much the actions of the current Shite dominated administration as a very flawed constitution that naively relies on the good graces of the ruling political party to fairly and responsibly include the different groups in government.  In any successful democratic political system, the need for consensus must be built directly into the constitutional mechanisms of the political process.  Obviously, calling yet another constitutional convention in order to re-write the constitution is clearly out of the question.  Even attempting to amend the constitution in the current volatile situation will only be a catalyst for more violence.  But perhaps by examining exactly how this constitutional flaw has manifested itself in Iraq’s current situation, we can stabilize the situation, find some movement for a viable way forward, and then make the necessary constitutional changes once we’re on firmer political ground.

Clearly, one needs separate and well-defined executive, legislative and judicial branches for a democracy to thrive.  But it is the legislature that should always be seen as-if not the core-than certainly first among equals.  With so much power vested in the legislature, it also needs to be an accurate reflection the people.  But the loaded phrase “the people” means so much more than the cold, aggregate sum of the individuals.  The historical landscape is littered with so many failed attempts at democracy that had slowly imploded because they mistakenly employed an over-simplified, atomized concept of what constitutes “the people”.  Real life is more molecular, more organic, and more fluid.   The makeup of the legislature should also reflect the various, diverse groups.  The surest way to do that is to that is with a bicameral legislature.  The lower house can represent the individuals with the upper house doing the same but also giving a necessary voice to the collective identity latently embedded in the various regions.

The biggest mistake made in creating Iraq’s constitution is that they remained willfully deaf and blind to the group dynamics.  While the Al-Maliki administration clearly has a great deal of culpability in its operation, this unfortunate oversight in design is more the fault of Iraq’s American and British advisors on the democratic process.  As a result, the Sunnis have never completely participated in a constitutionally flawed political process because they understandably feel that the Shiites will overwhelm them.  When they have genuinely tried to fully participate, they found that they were cruelly shut out from the political process.

An upper chamber like the U.S. Senate functioning alongside (and in some executive aspects-above) the Iraqi General Assembly may be just what’s needed.  With a Senate comprised of nine districts- three in the Shiite South, three in the Sunni triangle, and three in the Kurdish North- and having two senators representing each district; no religious or ethnic group could dominate.  This would induce the Sunnis to stay politically (as opposed to either militarily or covertly) engaged in a meaningful way.  The Shiites would be assured in knowing that they would still control a plurality of the General Assembly.  The Kurds would maintain much of the autonomy they have now while gradually playing a more active and proper role in Iraq’s internal affairs.  This stronger federal system will also help reassure any neighboring countries who are understandably concerned about any nationalist aspirations of their own Kurdish populations.

The Council of Union would work alongside the General Assembly for regular laws.  With at least ten senators needed to pass any law, the various groups would be forced to work together.  Ideally, the nine Senate Districts will straddle the eighteen provinces.  That is, only a few provinces should lie entirely within one Senate district.  Creating an overlapping meshwork will strengthen the Federal system.  It will also circumvent the type of provincialism that can also be very obstructionist if much less deadly than the sectarian paradigm that exists now.

Perhaps most importantly, with the Senate districts built into the fabric of land itself rather than directly tied to a particular ethnic group or religious sect, Iraq will have the means to eventually move away from the sectarian paradigm and assume a more cosmopolitan political identity while still retaining its Islamic character.

Creating an overlapping meshwork will also lessen the possibility of provinces banding together to form regions as is allowed in Chapter 5 of the Constitution.  This particular provision lends a level of uncertainty to the situation liable to cause problems later.  U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and others who have casually talked of simply breaking up Iraq as an easy solution exhibit a breath-taking naiveté.  Iraq will not be so easily or cleanly broken up.  Neighborhoods and even individual blocks would turn into battlefields as the differing groups would fight for every meter.  Like ripples in a pond, the turmoil would undoubtedly spill into the greater region.

When talking about the political situation, it’s also important to recognize that Iraq is a country that has bravely endured bombings from within and without for over a decade.  But as bad as the physical infrastructure has been damaged in all of this, it is its battered social infrastructure that is most crucial to a burgeoning democracy.  The trick may be in ostensibly rebuilding the former while actually repairing the latter.  If Europe or the United States had as high an unemployment rate as currently exists in Iraq, a similar level of volatile civil unrest would undoubtedly exist.  We need a Marshall Plan for the social infrastructure.

Several autonomous agencies should be created to oversee various restoration projects.  The constitutional framework for this already exists.   Part IV of the Iraqi constitution calls for the creation of independent organizations outside of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.  Article 110 states that oil revenue should be distributed fairly among the country’s regions and provinces but it does not go into specifics.  Having the both the work and the money effectively distributed through public works projects managed by the semi-autonomous agencies (as opposed to the all to prone to favoritism sectarian dominated provinces) is a way to pull the country out of the economic depression it is in while avoiding the typically small-minded provincialism that tends to derail economic progress.  Each semi-automous agency should have its own board of directors who are approved by the Council of Union.

Of course, no grand political settlement or seemingly magical socio-economic rejuvenation will occur unless the more immediate issue of the intense sectarian violence is checked.  Clearly a more concerted effort by the Iraqi military is in order but it won’t be enough.   Perhaps a high profile group of Sunni and Shiite Clerics could be induced to specifically condemn certain extreme aspects of the sectarian violence such as slow tortuous decapitations and attacks on mosques. Although some religious leaders have instigated much of the local violence, others have been particularly repulsed by the most recent severe turn of events and methods.  It is precisely these more severe means and methods of physical engagement that the more moderate religious authorities should stand together to condemn.  This is the easiest way to first reach and then slowly build on a broad consensus in order to pull this situation back from the brink.  Only then, after this vicious circle has been slowed down can the violence in general be properly addressed.

The stakes are high.  The resultant political vacuum left by the implosion of Iraq could easily draw in the entire region.  This is not the time to go small or simple with a few “this point in time” token cabinet appointments.  Only a clear, dynamic, and teleological change in the process can put Iraq on a forward path to a real functioning democracy.  Creating a ‘Senate’ to address the sectarian fragmentation and a Marshall Plan to mend the socioeconomic infrastructure with major input from the religious authorities on matters of engagement may be just the top down, bottom up, politically self-contained approach that’s needed. This integrated, pragmatic approach to political consensus could possibly be a loosely structured model for other struggling democracies-even those outside the region.  For Iraq as we know it, it may be our last, best hope.

About the Author: Brian Fox writes on culture and politics with a specialty on constitutionalism. His work has appeared in Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law, The Kiev Post, The Christian Science Monitor, The Jerusalem Post, The New York Metro, The Boston Herald, The Providence Journal and The American Thinker.